Spectre Voice (Coming Soon)

Nyxen Spectre Voice extends Nyxen’s doctrine to voice: time-limited, encrypted calls with no recordings, no voicemail, and no history. It is designed for conversations that should exist only while people are speaking—not as files on someone else’s infrastructure.

This page defines the intent and behavior of Spectre Voice for users, auditors, and implementers.

Concept

Spectre Voice is:

  • a temporary encrypted voice session

  • accessed via Nyxen keys / Capsules

  • bounded by:

    • a maximum call duration

    • optional per-session TTL

  • strictly no recording, no transcription

  • designed to be burned along with its parent context

Use cases:

  • sensitive internal syncs

  • incident calls

  • decision/approval moments

  • negotiation or briefing windows

[!IMPORTANT] Spectre Voice is explicitly designed without server-side recording or transcription. If you need a record, Nyxen is not the right channel.

Core Properties (Planned Design)

Property
Description

Access Model

Linked to Nyxen key / Capsule / Dead Drop

Encryption

End-to-end (DTLS-SRTP / WebRTC-style stack)

Duration Limit

Hard cap per session (e.g. 5–45 minutes)

Session TTL

Optional, e.g. must start within X minutes

Recording

Not provided. No server-side capture.

Identity

Pseudonymous within session; no public handle system

Burn Behavior

Burn context → voice handles invalidated, no rejoin

How Spectre Voice Fits Into Nyxen

Spectre Voice is not a standalone calling app.

It is always anchored to another Nyxen primitive, for example:

  • A Dead Drop Room with an attached Spectre Voice bridge

  • An Ephemeral Board session with a “Start Spectre Voice” button

  • A Capsule that includes:

    • Dead Drop

    • Board

    • File Drops

    • Signals / Ghost Codes

    • Spectre Voice session

The pattern: one operation, one environment, one burn event.

Capsule: DEAL-ALPHA
- Dead Drop Room
- Ephemeral Board
- File Drop: draft packet
- Spectre Voice: 20-min window
TTL: 90 minutes
Burn: ends all components, including call

Session Lifecycle (Intended Behavior)

  1. Initiate

  2. Negotiate

  3. Talk

  4. End

  5. Burn

1. Initiate

From a supported Nyxen context (e.g. Capsule, Dead Drop):

  • User clicks “Start Spectre Voice”.

  • Client:

    • verifies TTL / policies

    • derives a voice session key from the existing context key.

No global “call ID” directory; everything is scoped.

2. Negotiate (Connection)

Spectre Voice uses a WebRTC-style flow:

  • DTLS-SRTP for media encryption

  • Signaling via Nyxen relay using encrypted channels

const voiceKey = deriveKey(capsuleKey, "spectre-voice");
startEncryptedVoiceSession({ voiceKey, ttlSeconds });

  • All signaling messages are encrypted.

  • Nyxen relays do not see call content or keys.

3. Talk

During a Spectre Voice call:

  • Audio is:

    • encrypted end-to-end in transit

    • never written to disk server-side

  • UI:

    • shows participants as generic peers (e.g. “Peer 1”, “Peer 2”)

    • shows remaining time

    • indicates when TTL or Capsule expiry is near

No features:

  • No hold music

  • No voicemail

  • No call logs with identity tagging

  • No built-in transcripts

[!NOTE] Users may still record locally (OS-level or hardware). Nyxen design does not and cannot prevent endpoint capture.

4. End

Calls terminate when:

  • someone hangs up, or

  • max duration reached, or

  • parent TTL (Dead Drop / Capsule) ends, or

  • a burn event is triggered.

On termination:

  • Session keys cleared client-side.

  • Any ephemeral metadata (call start/end timestamps in context) can be:

    • disabled by policy, or

    • kept minimal (e.g. “Spectre Voice session occurred during Capsule lifetime”).

5. Burn

If the parent context is burned:

  • All active or pending Spectre Voice sessions:

    • are force-terminated,

    • cannot be rejoined,

    • cannot be re-established with the old keys.

onContextBurn(contextId) {
  endAllSpectreVoiceSessions(contextId);
  clearVoiceKeys(contextId);
}

[!WARNING] Burn is absolute. There is no way to “restore a call” or pull a recording from Nyxen.

Recommended Usage Patterns

Scenario
Duration Cap
Notes

Incident response bridge

10–20 minutes

Capsule + Board + Signals + Spectre Voice

Legal / negotiation touchpoint

10–15 minutes

Use Board for points; no transcripts

Internal high-sensitivity sync

5–15 minutes

Treat as verbal-only; decisions documented in your own infra if required

Escalation call after Ghost Code

5–10 minutes

E.g. Ghost Code 777 → join Spectre Voice

[!TIP] Think of Spectre Voice as a secure corridor: enter, speak, leave. If something must be recorded for compliance, handle it intentionally and outside Nyxen.

Security Considerations

Spectre Voice aims to mitigate:

  • server-side call recording risk

  • logging of call contents

  • linkable identity/account-based call histories

It does not eliminate:

  • endpoint compromise (malware, rootkits)

  • physical environment risks (shoulder-surfing, nearby devices)

  • user-level recording (screen/audio capture)

Implementation should:

  • use strong, modern voice encryption (DTLS-SRTP)

  • enforce:

    • short, non-configurable maximum durations

    • auto-termination at context expiry

  • not expose:

    • phone numbers

    • SIP addresses

    • persistent call IDs across contexts

Integration with Tor & Network Constraints

Spectre Voice over Tor is:

  • possible but constrained

  • subject to higher latency and reliability issues

Guidance:

  • mark Spectre Voice as “network dependent”

  • recommend:

    • using it primarily where connectivity supports low-latency encrypted media

    • allowing Tor users to fall back to Dead Drops + Boards if media is unstable

Status

Spectre Voice is defined here as a design and intent:

  • “Coming Soon” in UI

  • this page sets:

    • expectations for ephemerality,

    • non-recording posture,

    • key/TTL alignment with Nyxen doctrine.

As it ships, implementation details (codecs, TURN usage, specific crypto libs) should be added here without changing the core guarantees:

No archives. No server-side recordings. No weakening of Nyxen’s model.

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